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Liquid democracy is defined as a cyber 
democracy that combines representative 
democracy and spontaneous direct 
democracy by using technologies of the 
web 2.0. In recent years, some political 
theorists and actors have been optimistic 
that liquid democracy could make a more 
participatory and direct democracy 
possible to fulfil the democratic promise 
of freedom and equality of the people. 
One could even ask if a supra-national 
system could become a democratic option 
by using digital technologies for 
discussions and deciding. After the 
historical transformations of democracy, 
 
LAW 






VOLUME 23 (2019) 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2077-
4907/2019/ldd.v23b7   
ISSN:  2077-4907 
 CC-BY 4.0 
 
 LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 182  
 
from the Greek city state via the nation-state to a global or supra-national unit, and the 
second and third ones came or come with a loss of participation, there could be, according 
to net-optimists, a fourth and more participatory transformation of democracy. This 
article doubts the emancipatory and participatory potential of liquid democracy 
(especially for a supra-national system), and I choose the classical theoretical perspective 
of democracy´s ancient core elements of  free and equal participation. By analysing the 
arguments of net-optimists the problems for participation in a political sphere are shown. 
The point the paper wants to make is that under the circumstances of a (digital) oligopoly-
capitalism, fragmentation, and digital divide, or in short, the omnipresent influence of big 
social inequalities, a cyber-democracy is an unlikely ideal. 
Keywords: Civic participation, ICT, Global democracy, Liquid democracy, 
Republicanism transformation 
1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Robert Dahl there have been two transformations of democracy.1 The first 
established democracy in the ancient Greek city state (polis). There democracy was 
defined literally as the rule of the people, for instance by Aristotle.2 Democracy was 
understood as the equal right of participation by free citizens in person, and the identity 
of rulers and subjects. The second transformation established representative 
democracy in nation-states. This happened by the end of the 18th and the beginning of 
the 19th century, based on political representation and free and equal elections. Dahl´s 
argument is that this is a history of a decrease in participatory politics, defined by the 
increasing size of the political unit. There is, however, a third transformation going on. 
This is democracy in a supra-national (or maybe, later globalised) system, as it appears 
in the European Union.3 In an expanding territory and population in a supranational 
unit, the chances to make representatives accountable decrease. 
However, this wave could be linked to participation via the Internet and 
information communication technologies (ICTs) in new ways, as many theorists (the 
net-optimists) , like Howard Rheingold or Esther Dyson4, have hoped since the 1990s.  
“Previous technological breakthroughs have commonly generated exaggerated hopes 
that machines can transform society and democracy.”5 For example, Rheingold believes 
“that this technology, if properly understood and defended by enough citizens, does 
have democratizing potential in the way that alphabets and printing press had 
 
1 Dahl R Democracy and its critics New Haven: Yale University Press (1989) at 13-36. 
2 Aristotle (translated by Jowett B) Politics  New York: Dover Publications (2000) at 40-b 16.  
3 See Dahl (1989) at 311-321. 
4 See generally Rheingold H The virtual community: Homesteading on the electronic frontier Boston: 
Addison-Wesley (1993) and Dyson E Release 2.1: A design for living in the digital age Danvers: Crown 
Business (1998). 
5 Norris P Digital divide: Civic engagement, information poverty, and the internet worldwide Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2001) at 232. 
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democratizing effects”6. But he accepts that ICTs do not always generate a rational or 
benevolent outcome; at least the Internet would offer the potential for a participatory 
turn.7 
However, such recent ICTs never made it into Dahl´s thought.  So the question 
arises: could a fourth transformation of democracy, in its digital guise, bring 
participatory and direct democracy back into the representative practices so common 
to modern democracies? Such digital guise would be the concept of liquid democracy 
(also known as delegative voting), which means a fluid and flexible digital combination 
of representative and direct, spontaneous democracy in digital forums.8 It is defended 
by contemporary net-optimists, such as, Anna Litvinenko , Jennifer Paech and Daniel 
Reichert.9 
In this article, I examine the dialectics of liquid democracy in a supra-national 
democracy (meaning, the democracy after its third transformation) specifically: could 
liquid democracy as a form of direct democracy stop the decay of participation? ; could 
it cause a turn towards a broader political participation on a supranational level? My 
theoretical answer is orientated toward classical Greek ideas and original values of 
democracy, concerning the question of how to increase participation for the citizens.10 
This model shares some assumptions with Hannah Arendt´s,11 or Aristotle´s account 
that a polis means the freedom to decide, especially to act and speak, about those issues 
that concern the community as a whole; and that one is free if s/he can participate in 
this public realm.  
By using this model, I argue against the optimistic approach that there can be a 
certain form of digital democracy that increases participation in a political sphere, at 
least not under our current social circumstances. My argument is that analogous social 
problems make a participatory and egalitarian digital democracy, such as liquid 
democracy, hardly possible on a national scale and impossible on a supra-national level. 
Such social problems are, for instance, social fragmentation, neo-liberal economy and 
commercialisation of politics and society, and extreme social inequalities, combined 
with an unequal access to the digital sphere and very different socio-cultural traditions. 
All of them run against the egalitarian republican ethos of classical citizenship.  
 
6 Rheingold (1993) at 279. 
7 Rheingold H Smart mobs: The next social revolution New York: Basic Books (2002) at 163f. 
8 See generally Winkel O “Demokratie und digitalisierung” (2012) 8(2) der moderne staat at 409-434. This 
concept was developed by the European Pirate Parties and cooperating NGOs, including the German 
organisation Liquid Democracy e V . 
9  Litvinenko A “Social media and perspectives of liquid democracy: The example of political 
communication in the Pirate Party in Germany” in Gascó M (ed) ECEG2012-Proceedings of the 12th 
European Conference on e-Government vol 1 Berks: Academic Bookshop (2012) at 403-407. See also 
Paech J & Reichert D “Potenziale nutzen mit Liquid Democracy” in Friedrichsen M & Kohn RA (eds) 
Digitale Politikvermittlung. Chancen und Risiken interaktiver Medien (2014) at 499-515 & 506-511. 
10  Of course I do neither want to argue pro-slavery nor the exclusion of women, but for the conceptual 
core of democracy, as the equality and freedom of citizens  nowadays. 
11  Arendt H The human condition Chicago/ London: University of Chicago Press (1958) at 28-37. 
 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 184  
 
Therefore, I examine the dialectics of digital democracy, especially liquid 
democracy. Before this can be done, some short explanations are necessary, about the 
connection between the three transformations of democracy, and how a neo-classical 
democracy theory can be linked to that (part 2). Then, I summarize the assumptions and 
arguments of the net-optimists for a democratic renewal in the digital sphere (part 3.1). 
Afterwards, I  elaborate five arguments against the digital turn (part 3.2), because 
democracy needs a basic republican consensus of the citizens and  equal participation in 
a common sphere, oriented toward a common good, defined by the political community, 
the demos. This is not the case in the digital sphere, for reasons I indicate. A conclusion 
(part 4)  brings my arguments into context with Dahl´s third transformation. 
2 A CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF DEMOCRACY 
According to the first model of democracy in ancient Greece, citizens were free in a 
negative way (freedom from oppression and economic, as well as private, forces) and in 
a positive way (freedom of the right to speak, act and decide freely). The demos of these 
face-to-face societies assembled in the ekklesia and decided about the issues concerning 
the polis as a whole, as  opposed to one´s private needs, forces and interests (oikos).12 
So, demokratia means the free and equal participation of the citizens. The people´s 
assembly has legislative competences and should control the magistrates of the polis. 
Officeholders mostly were recruited by lot, because then the chances were really equal 
to become a magistrate.13 These political offices are not just controlled by the ekklesia, 
but by political principles, such as, annuity, collegiality and the prohibition of iterations.  
In this classical model, political power belongs to the collective of the multitude, 
who should decide together on issues that concern the State as a whole, and individuals 
should just get as much power as necessary.14 According to Aristotle, a good political 
system is not driven by egoistic preferences, but the pursuit of the public or common 
good. If one combines Aristotle´s approach with classical democracies, a democracy is 
the direct participation of the people, in order to reach a common good for the people.15 
Stated  shortly: if one can overcome the deterministic private sphere of inequality and 
hierarchy, which means, if one can fulfil his/her basic (mostly materialistic) needs , then 
one can become free to participate in a political community in order to decide for the 
polis as a community. 
After the second transformation, representative democracy is less democratic or 
participatory , or even aristocratic, because elections are about recruiting elites, instead 
of free and equal participation in legislation. In classical democracies citizens decided 
on their own about political issues and controlled the administration of their respective 
polities; but in modern democracies there is hardly a direct political participation of this 
 
12 Aristotle (2000) at 17-b 41. 
13  Aristotle  (2000) at b7-10. 
14  Jones AHM Athenian democracy Oxford: Oxford University Press (1957) at 108-118. 
15  Nagle B The household as the foundation of Aristotle´s polis (2006) at 19-32 & 54f . 
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kind.16 Instead, there are elections to recruit political elites. Voting for the best person 
(instead of letting everyone decide) is, according to classical politics, an aristocratic way 
of recruiting politicians. While citizens could assemble in a city-state, this is not possible 
in an (extended) nation-state, because of the geographical and demographic sizes of the 
political unit. Thus, to classical democracy, the election of politicians who are free to 
decide what they may think  is the best, is an elitist tool. The model of representative 
democracy is to let the representatives decide instead of, and for, the people. The direct 
power of the citizens is reduced to elections, to vote for actors who will do the job of a 
classical citizen: deliberating and law-making. With the second transformation, scholars, 
like Gordon Wood, state it to be the end of classical politics, because this shift was 
modern and liberal: it generated a representative democracy without large citizen 
participation or a concept of a common good, but a balance of power.17 
The third transformation seems to enlarge the problem of the lack of political 
equality and participation as the two main core principles of democracy. In a supra-
national system, or even a global state, as theorists like David Held suggest, it is not 
possible to have as many delegates as in a nation-state, because as the population  
grows,  the number of representatives does not increase proportionally.18 That is why 
the third transformation could be the one that harms the original promises of 
democracy the most.19 
What Dahl explains seems to be a rule: the bigger the size of territory and 
population, the lesser the possibilities of people´s participation, and the more independent 
the delegates become from the influence of the citizens.20 In a bigger unit, representation 
becomes more dominant (in relation to direct democracy), and if the political united 
grows even more, there are less representatives for more citizens; ergo, there is less 
representation of regions or certain social groups.21 
The approach of a neo-classical model of democracy is a democracy with the free 
and equal participation of the demos, and, because representation is necessary in a 
larger political unit, a greater accountability of political representatives. The purpose is 
that the citizenry can choose on their own what they think  is the best for the political 
collective by discussing and deciding together if there is a common attitude and a 
defined common good.  
 
16  Dahl (1989) at 13-39. 
17  Wood GS The creation of the American republic 1776-1787 (1969) at 606-615. 
18  See generally Held D Democracy and the global order: From the modern state to cosmopolitan 
democracy Stanford: Stanford University Press (1995). 
19  Dahl (1989) at 311-321. See also Jörke D Die Größe der Demokratie: Über die räumliche Dimension von 
Herrschaft und Partizipation Berlin: Suhrkamp (2019) at 132-177. 
20  One can even state that the positive freedom of the participation of equal citizens vanished gradually 
with the rise of liberalism and liberal democracy (Arendt (1971) at 38-78). 
21  Jörke (2019) at 41-79. 
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Indeed, there are many other theoretical concepts that could be used with regard to  
digital democracy in general or even liquid democracy .22 Unfortunately, this article 
cannot go deeply into the theoretical discussions on different democracy concepts. 
However, some words on the neo-classical model may be necessary. There seem to be 
two main points for choosing such an approach for my analysis. First, ancient 
democracy was the original and first democracy. There, a neutral core of the concept got 
defined (as the free, equal and direct participation of the people in the public realm). 
This core idea got lost in many parts or  fundamentally reduced during the second (and 
third) transformation. With regard to a digital direct democracy, the classical model 
with a high participatory approach could be useful for conceptual orientation. Secondly, 
if one focuses not just on rational discourses, but especially on the fate of free and equal 
participation, then a neo-classical perspective makes more sense, because it connotes 
the idea of  an original democratic participation as the most direct and literal form: the 
rule of the people in a polis. It means, that the people rule as free and equals over their 
political system, driven by the common good of their political unit, because in the first 
place they are not motivated by private economic forces anymore.23 This does not mean 
that other democratic theories would not be legitimate as well. It just means that the 
neo-classical perspective can offer a valid analysis of digital democracy, a perspective 
that is as yet hardly used for this topic.  
3 DIALECTICS OF LIQUID DEMOCRACY 
Global governance suggests a decrease of direct democracy and making MPs 
accountable. In the web 2.0, ICT offers the dislocation of acting, because the Internet is a 
global and open medium, and has multimodal possibilities of interaction.24 The idea of 
the public sphere as an arena where political decisions are made, and collective political 
identities are shaped, is a crucial point for a (neo-)classical democratic approach25. 
There are different suggestions for ways to improve political communication in the 
digital sphere. Some definitions may be necessary. For instance, the ideas of digital 
political communication and control refer to the term digital democracy. That means, in 
general, every form of democratic interaction in the digital sphere. One more specific 
 
22  For instance, the concept of deliberative democracy is usually used in the debates on digital 
democracy. Habermas´s (Habermas J Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und 
des demokratischen Rechtsstaats Frankfurt a M : Suhrkamp (1992)) theory of deliberation is very 
important in the debate on digital democracy, because optimists hope that the Internet can deliver 
certain new self-organised arenas for a public discourse to construct rational decisions; of course, my 
argument for choosing a (neo-)classical model has to be very short, and more points should be made. 
23  This perspective shares some similarities with other participatory republican theories, such as the one 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, like the critique of  free mandatory representation, the idea of a common 
good that can be found by a people´s assembly etc. 
24  Petzold C, Katzenbach C & Fraas C “Digitale Plattformen und Öffentlichkeiten medialisierter politischer 
Kommunikation” (2014) 22/23 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 28 at 30f . 
25  Gimmler A “Deliberative democracy, the public sphere and the internet” (2001) 4 Philosophy & Social 
Criticism 21 at 22. 
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participatory concept of such a digital democracy is cyber-democracy. It claims the self-
government of the people by interacting in a virtual community. Further, the most 
participatory and very specific approach of a cyber-democracy is that of liquid 
democracy. Liquid democracy is defined as the possibility of everyone to participate in 
decision processes or to delegate his/her voice. This should make the distinction 
between representative and direct democracy fluid, by using ICT for spontaneous 
decisions, votes and debates for a collective intelligence. 
Thus, this concept intends a democratic transformation, as Dahl demands it in 
order to stop the decay of participation: “people governing themselves as political 
equals, and possessing all the resources and institutions necessary to do so”26.  It offers 
a link between web 2.0 and democracy 3.0 towards a fourth, digital transformation of 
democracy.27 However, it is unclear if the digital sphere will become a genuinely 
political and democratic realm. That means more than information and communication. 
What is at stake is whether it can empower the demos to rule the polis. 
“The Internet may broaden involvement in public life by eroding some of the 
barriers to political participation and civic engagement.”28 That is why net-optimists 
think that a digital democracy is possible because the technical instruments could 
create an autonomous sphere.29 Because of new public forms, there is the hope that this 
will be the basis of a broad, free and equal participation of the people. Forms of direct 
democracy could become easier. 
3.1 Arguments for liquid democracy 
In the 1990s, it was believed that the Internet could be an addition to representative 
democracy and broaden political participation. The Internet could provide an 
empowerment of the people via e-voting, e-petitions and e-referenda. According to the 
optimists, there are several conditions that explain why the Internet has a democratic 
potential First, the number of its users has greatly increased in recent years. On a global 
scale this makes  broad inclusion and political communication thinkable. Furthermore, 
the amount of political information on the Internet increased as well. So the optimists 
think that this could create a virtual deliberation, an enrichment of the political 
discourse. Let me summarize the main arguments for a participatory cyber-democracy. 
         First,  access to the Internet would be easy to get, independent in time and space. 
The potential of interactions is global. ICTs make communication and participation 
easier. Secondly, information presented on the Internet could be independent of political 
 
26  Dahl (1989) at 341. 
27  Kneuer M “Demokratischer durch das Internet? Potenzial und Grenzen des Internets für die Stärkung 
der Demokratie” in Schieren S (ed) Demokratischer durch das Internet? Grundlagen, Trends und 
Herausforderungen Schwalbach: Wochenschau (2012) at 36-44. See also Roleff D “Digitale Politik und 
Partizipation: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen” (2012) 7 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 14 at 16-20.  
28  Norris (2001) at 97.  
29  Buchstein H  “Bytes that bite: The internet and deliberative democracy” (1997) 4(2) Constellations 248 
at 248f. See also Winner L The whale and the reactor: A search for limits in an age of high technology 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1986) at 54. 
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influence, and the missing professional control of the quality of the information could be 
compensated for by a check of the representatives by the demos in the system of checks 
and balances. Thirdly, the Internet seems to be transparent. Fourthly, access would be 
cheap or costless. Fifthly, it could shape a counter-public, emancipatory area. Sixthly, 
different interest groups could get connected in order to shape a new networked public 
sphere, achieved by self-regulation without the influence of a higher authority, just 
because of an increasing number of users. Seventhly, that is why a deregulated Internet 
would have the chance to become less immune from authorities or authoritarianism.30 
The most radical approach of cyber-democracy , according to its own claim, that is 
near to classical democratic participation is liquid democracy. According to its 
proponents, liquid democracy would offer a more flexible form of making political 
decisions.31 By using a liquid feedback, citizens or party members could discuss and 
decide politically on the web anytime. Programmatic applications could be presented 
there ad hoc. Furthermore, unlike a common representative system with regular 
elections,  the citizen can at any time elect a delegate or take his/her vote away. This 
could be done by software, such as, Liquid Feedback or Adhocracy. In the first case, for 
instance, one starts an initiative to get support. Suggestions by others can be made 
on how the initiative or idea can be improved. Then the initiative or petition or 
application can be modified, based on the feedback32.  
Thus, citizens could locate themselves somewhere between representation and 
participation spontaneously. The delegates would no longer be representatives with 
independent mandates , because according to this new concept participants can vote for 
single policies as well. This would be done by voting for only one part of a political 
program of a candidate, and by making this person the delegate just for this specific 
topic; and maybe the majority make another candidate or party the delegate for another 
one. Citizens would not just vote online for a party but for different opinions and 
positions. More or less, the mandate would be imperative: if the delegate does not fulfil 
the program for which s/he was elected , citizens could take their vote away. This 
means a mixture of political programs and principles. If this would work, citizens could 
decide about political topics and could make the MPs accountable anytime. Politicians 
would rather present political decisions of the voters to the parliament and to society, 
 
30  Buchstein (1997) at 250f. See also Winkel  (2012)  at 412-416. See further Dyson (1998). This digital 
participation could be done via different platforms: for instance, social media like Facebook and 
Twitter (one could even think of Instagram), interactive broadcast services such as YouTube, or online 
forums. Even the term forum implies an ancient approach and democratic promise of participation, as a 
place to assemble in person, to discuss and to decide, like the republican Forum Romanum or the 
Agora in democratic Athens (Buchstein (1997) at 257f. See also Perlot F Deliberative Demokratie und 
Internetforen – Nur eine virtuelle Diskussion? Baden-Baden: Nomos (2008) at 125-127. 
31  Adler A Liquid Democracy in Deutschland. Zur Zukunft digitaler politischer Entscheidungsfindung nach 
dem Niedergang der Piratenpartei Bielefeld: Transcript (2018) at 56-78. 
32  Liquid Feedback “Decisions made easy” (2019) Liquid-Feedback-Online at 
https://liquidfeedback.org/index.en.html (accessed 13 March 2019). In the case of Adhocracy, every 
citizen would be allowed to discuss and decide/vote on topics on this platform via the software 
(Adhocracy “Was it Adhocracy?” (2019)  Adhocracy-Online at https://adhocracy.de/static/ueber-
uns/was-ist-adhocracy-2.html (accessed 13 March 2019)). 
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than try to represent them.33 The idea of elected representatives is an aristocratic 
concept of recruiting elites in order to let them rule for the people, instead of letting the 
people themselves decide on political topics on their own. The aristocratic 
representation would be undermined in favour of the demos. This implies the belief that 
the rights and possibilities of citizens to participate would make the rigid elements of 
the representative system in the second stage of democracy more fluid, liquid and 
participatory.34 
Of course, this democratic approach implies at least a revolutionary element 
because the traditional model of a party democracy , such as free mandates as the core 
element of representative democracy, could vanish. However, most of the time liquid 
democracy is not thought of as a revolutionary concept but as a participatory digital 
addition to representative democracy. The egalitarian idea behind that concept is 
making hierarchies as flat as possible in a decentralised participatory democracy.35 E-
voting, liquid feedback and evaluations are suggested to become a virtual ekklesia. 
Filtering and refining political opinions would not need the reduction of participation in 
order to make the decisions of representatives decisive, because the virtual community 
of a liquid democracy could be coordinated by software. This includes the individual 
and easy choice of one´s own participation, collaborative shaping of political texts, a 
dynamic mix of representation and direct participation, the inclusion of the engagement 
of NGOs, and both top-down and bottom-up processes.  Liquid democracy would be a 
promising concept to include the social potential into digital ways of participation.36 
However, because of its decentralisation, the liquidazation promise of the software, 
and its virtual character, fans of liquid democracy can think about an adaptation on a 
supranational level by aggregating opinions.37 Thus, if liquid democracy could realize 
the classical democratic approach on a national or supranational level, then it would 





33  Liquid Democracy e V “Über Liquid” Liquid Democracy-Online (2019) at https://liqd.net/de/about/ 
(accessed 13 March 2019). 
34  See generally Bieber C “Die Veränderung politischer Kommunikation im Internetzeitalter” (2013) 
Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften at 162-164. 
35  Moser H “Die Veränderung der politischen Teilnahme und Partizipation im Zeitalter der digitalen Netz“ 
in Biermann R, Fromme J & Verständig D (eds) Partizipative Medienkulturen: Positionen und 
Untersuchungen zu veränderten Formen öffentlicher Teilhabe Wiesbaden: VS Springer (2014) at 35-38. 
36  Paech & Reichert (2014) at 507-511. Yet, this concept was mostly practised in the context of a nation-
state, for instance in Germany, Japan and Brasilia, without success. In Germany, for instance, the Pirate 
Party tested liquid democracy for party members, but moderation and participation took too much 
time. So participation was quite low (1 to 1.5 per cent of the members) (Adler (2018) at 14-19). 
37  Dörre J & Bukow G “Die Grenzen geteilten Handelns und neuer partizipativer Demokratieformen” in 
Biermann R, Fromme J & Verständig D (eds) Partizipative Medienkulturen: Positionen und 
Untersuchungen zu veränderten Formen öffentlicher Teilhabe Wiesbaden: VS Springer (2014) at 90-92. 
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3.2 Why digital democracy does not work 
Contemporary democracy theorists ask if the Internet shrinks the world to a global 
village. If this is true, the classical criteria for the people to assemble virtually in a new 
people´s ekklesia would be given by ICT. Benjamin Barber, for example, who argues for a 
participatory democracy in a Rousseauistic or Aristotelian style, is very sceptical about 
the possibilities of a strong digital democracy in a society dominated by technology,38 
and for good reasons. 
He identifies three possible scenarios concerning the relation between the Internet 
and democracy. First, Barber is aware of the fact that market forces may drive or control 
the web. This could lead to an Electronic Colonialism, when basic techniques of political 
discourse get commercialised. Secondly, ICTs can lead to  standardisation, control, or 
repression by elites. He is aware of the dangers and disadvantages, and questions the 
libertarian approach of some net-optimists.  Thirdly, besides those dangers, Barber 
sketches  one (Jeffersonian) democratic scenario of free and equal communication and 
information for education with a participatory approach to the citizenship (and the 
people´s knowledge, sensus communis and ratio) of interaction. This could lead to a 
plebiscitary majoritarianism of responsible citizens and self-governing communities. 
However, even if the  scenario of a liquid democratic republic would be the case, Barber 
points out that this participation could be undermined because the Internet is also an 
economic sphere. That means that private issues, such as, entertainment, commerce, 
and consumerism, come together with the political approach of free and equal citizens 
seeking their common good.39 Thus, this sceptical democrat and net-neutralist offers a 
highly differentiated perspective. 
Mostly, I agree with Barber, and  include his arguments in my own critique. 
Barber´s doubts show that the assumptions of liquid democracy are very idealistic or do 
not adequately point out  many crucial analogous circumstances that influence the 
Internet. This causes several normative problems concerning the idea of a digital 
democratic republic. Barber does not specify those problems in detail, but I do. 
Therefore, I will present five main reasons. 
3.2.1 The lack of informed decisions 
First, there is a problem with information. On the web one finds a flood of unfiltered and 
contradictory information; and among this mass of information there is a lot of fake-
news. It becomes harder to distinguish the latter from reliable news or opinions. If 
citizens are not  informed in an, at least mostly, correct or coherent manner, it is 
difficult for them to decide, on the basis of more or less equal basic knowledge, on an 
issue. One could say,that a participatory democracy would just mean the rule of the 
majority. Then it would not matter if the information is correct when citizens vote; it 
 
38  Barber B Strong democracy. Participatory politics for a new age 2nd ed Berkeley/ Los Angeles/ London: 
University of California Press (2004) at 117-312. 
39  Barber B “Three scenarios for the future of technology and strong democracy” (1999) 4 Political 
Science Quarterly at 573-589. 
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would still be an (ineffective) democracy. Yet this is not the only classical approach of  
equal people. In an ekklesia citizens decide after getting more or less correct 
information in a free debate. That is why a working democracy is not a “tyranny of the 
majority”. Free speech as the political freedom, according to Arendt is essential for 
politics.40 
Furthermore, unfiltered information generates a dialectical perspective (and, in the 
best case, new information) on decision topics. Thus, the loss of the quality of political 
decisions – because of fake-news – causes a loss of quantitative factors as well, because 
then the question arises who and how many citizens should participate directly in a 
liquid democracy, if the common people can hardly distinguish what is true. If the 
digital political system bases itself on the direct participation of the people, concerning 
elections and voting on political decisions in the delegative voting of liquid democracy, 
fake-news and the knowledge of the citizens create a much bigger lack of legitimacy 
than optimists are willing to admit41. Just as in the elitist model of representative 
democracy – where representatives should decide rationally, because it is assumed that 
the common people cannot do so – the rational output of a decision trumps the input for 
the decision made by the citizens. If one assumes that the demos is uneducated and not 
enlightened, not because of a lack of information but because of fake-news, it is difficult 
to argue that such a system may be legitimate. 
 
3.2.2 Fragmentation and segregation 
These new digital floods of information do not lead to pluralistic discourses, but  digital 
fragmentation and segregation. The approach of the people deciding together in one 
common public sphere erodes. The inclusive element of democracy is lost if groups 
separate themselves and will hardly interact. Because the masses of data and 
information on the web overcharge our minds, users integrate themselves into interest 
groups. There they get only preselected information, based on preferences and 
algorithms. Thus, the Internet may have the potential to shape certain small separated 
spheres that are only concerned with certain policies, ideologies, and worldviews. Cass 
Sunstein calls them “deliberative enclaves”. This could cause isolationism, polarisation, 
or even extremism.42 
It is so because social fragmentation would not shape an identity for the users as an 
autonomous collective, which is the necessary imagination of one demos or citizenry. 
Even if the people are pluralistic and diverse, for liquid democracy it is necessary to act 
together on one common platform and to shape common decisions after 
speaking/chatting and discussing with each other. Fragmented enclaves, however, 
 
40  Arendt (1958) at 24-27. 
41  See generally Gaughan A “Illiberal democracy: The toxic mix of fake news, hyperpolarization, and 
partisan election administration” (2017) 12(3) Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy at 64-
74. 
42  Sunstein C Republic 2.0 Princeton: Princeton University Press (2001) at 67-71. See generally Dahlberg 
L “Rethinking the fragmentation of the cyberpublic: From consensus to contestation” (2007) 9 New 
Media and Society at 828-831. 
 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 23 (2019) 
 
Page | 192  
 
create different identities. These are unlikely to find the citizens’ consensus (a 
contingent character of one demos) on basic topics and habits or even to accept one 
shared digital arena. Then it is impossible to seek a republican common will or good in a 
digital society with such great heterogeneity.43 These sub-public spheres shape their 
own communities, which may not be linked to a certain State or other public realms. 
Thus, the classical approach of people obtaining an overview of the whole polis and 
its issues, cannot be presented by the numerous different fragmented groups, topics, 
information, and the complex contexts of contemporary politics (on a national or 
international level). Even if these deliberative enclaves are smart mobs, as Rheingold 
calls them44, using new tools for their social interests, they may not become a virtual 
citizenry. There is no common political identity. Something is missing, that could make 
them a demos, consisting of citizens that are willing to interact as free and equal on an 
online platform, driven by  liquid democracy software. Indeed, the problem of a missing 
united political identity, that a classical citizen adds to his/her private identity, is a 
typical phenomenon of a modern atomistic society. This is not just a problem for digital 
communications, and  Sunstein´s thesis is that digital enclaves and algorithmic digital 
bubbles even increase the isolation and atomisation of society.45 The roots of such 
phenomena are of course not solely digital, and  liquid democracy may be an option for 
those private, fragmented groups to organise themselves. However, fragmentation is a 
huge problem for a larger political unit. In fragmented societies of a national or supra-
national unit liquid democracy will not happen, if there is not interaction but isolation. 
3.2.3 The digital divide 
Both the presented arguments lead to a digital divide. Especially in the 1990s the so- 
called net-pessimists thought that the Internet would be an exclusive sphere, because 
most users were male, young, and educated.46 This is still correct, even if the number of  
users is increasing, and the users are becoming more diverse. If one thinks about a 
supra-national liquid democracy, the different possibilities of obtaining access in 
various world regions undermine an egalitarian approach. Yet one could speculate : 
what if those problems could be solved, maybe in one generation (at least in the West). 
A democracy 4.0 would be completed when every citizen of the supra-national unit has 
access to the Internet. However, even if everyone obtains access,  there would still be 
two groups: a minority of very active and well informed users and a majority of passive 
ones that may give a political statement a “Like”, but then they are done.47  
At least such a distinction alone would just be a variable de facto distinction, 
because it does not distinguish de jure, like a representative system does, with the 
distinction between passive voters and active MPs. However, the passive group may be 
 
43  Buchstein (1997) at 254-259. See also Jakob D & Thomas M “Das Internet als Heilsbringer der 
Demokratie?” (2014) 22/23 Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte at 38f. 
44  See generally Rheingold (2002). 
45  See generally Sunstein (2001). 
46  Norris (2001) at 230. 
47  Norris (2001) at 231. 
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passive as non-political people, or may be disinterested in certain issues. This is their 
free, non-civic decision.48 However, this is even more problematic if the individual has 
to find out on his/her own how far his/her political engagement should go in a flexible 
and spontaneous system such as a liquid democracy. Furthermore, not everyone may be 
able or willing to use the devices or digital rules that are not self-explanatory as well. 
Even if everyone would have access to the web, not everyone has the necessary 
technical skills. The greater the barriers to participation(such as, the need for skills and 
devices) are, the less inclusive, egalitarian or participatory the political sphere is.49 
These restrictions undermine the democratic approach because inside  the digital 
system there would be at least two political classes, with just one of them  part of the 
political debates and decisions. Undermining political equality creates the oxymoron of 
a divided democracy.50 Combined, these three arguments show a strong discrepancy 
between dealing with masses of complex information and technical skills, on the one 
hand, and the expectation of  equal participation, on the other .51 
3.2.4 Emotional debates and the problem of rationality 
The approach of digital democracy is often that of a deliberative democracy.52 However, 
the digital discourses are shaped in a way that does not fulfil Habermas´s conditions for 
a deliberate democracy.53 Neither do they fulfil the conditions for a classical republican 
democracy. That is one reason why digital discourses are often basically irrational. This 
does not mean that presented arguments always have to be rational and logical to 
realise a democracy. There is the risk that discussions become irrational in the 
undecided sphere of politics. But what is necessary is a basic consent on how to discuss 
topics, a certain debating culture that respects the rights of the participants. Such 
consensus is missing in digital agoras.54 Provocative or extreme opinions are  discussed 
much more than arguments. Quite often emotional debates, hate speech and masses of 
vulgar, verbal violence dominate the arenas, and harm the free speech that is necessary 
for a democracy. Thus hate speech etc. harm  free discourse. This can be done by 
persons who are not really acting as citizens (in a public sphere as public persons) 
because they hide themselves in anonymity; and sometimes participants are bots.55  
Since pre-emptive real-time media censoring or moderation is not really possible, 
the necessary function of moderating and planning the agenda to discuss does not take 
 
48  Roleff (2012) at 15f. 
49  Jakob  & Thomas  (2014)  at 37. 
50  Sunstein C #Republic: Divided democracy in the age of social media Princeton: Princeton University 
Press (2017) at 59-136 & 252-262. 
51  Winkel (2012) at 423f. 
52  Buchstein (1997) at 248. 
53  Habermas (1992). 
54  Sunstein (2017) at 191-212. 
55  These are computer programs, that automatically post and reproduce certain comments on social 
media by using fake accounts. 
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place in those virtual assemblies.56 One could say that if there is no moderation, like the 
boulé in Athens,  nor the necessary way of a citizenship with a political ethos, then the 
classical approach does not fit. 
3.2.5 Economic powers on the web  
Thus far we have heard about net-optimists who share the hope of a potential for 
emancipation of  web 2.0, and the net-pessimists who think that ICT will not improve 
social and political situations. Even if this article appears to be  quite pessimistic, it 
shares one point with a third group: the net-neutralists. I think that they are right in 
their view that the Internet does not have a genuinely democratic or political function 
per se, because web 2.0 is neutral in its function. 57 This makes the Internet  not just a 
sphere of political discussion, but of economy and crime, too. Yet, the Internet is not an 
instrument of political decision-making, or the voice of a sovereign people; and there is 
anarchic resistance by, for example, hyper-libertarians, hyper-capitalists, resistance 
movements, or criminals. Global economic interests, that are coordinated and presented 
on the web, are dominating it.58  
The new global powers of the web are transnational companies, but hardly one 
supra-national State (under the people´s power). Thus the Internet will not  (and should 
not ) only consist of political arenas. It is already a commercialised space, too. Both co-
exist. Users that want to use one of these spheres will be forced to combine them. 
Further, the Internet is not a genuinely political sphere, but a sphere of social inequality 
as well, when companies dominate its structures and contents. Their economic power 
creates a hierarchy, because they have much more influence than a common citizen. 
These inequalities and commercials are not distinct from political debates. It is 
impossible to act as free and equal political entities when one tries to do it in a mostly 
economic sphere.59 According to neo-classicism, participation and positive freedom are 
linked to a non-economic perspective.60 Political freedom is just possible if one´s 
economic basic needs are fulfilled. Then s/he can overcome the need to accept other 
citizens as free and equal in the public realm, without being driven by one´s own private 
interests or needs. However, if both spheres are mixed up (oikos and polis) in one 
medium, classical political freedom and equality are impossible because of economic 
forces, distractions, advertisements, entertainment, infotainment, money and needs. A 
consumers´ and producers´ society, driven by mostly economic factors, cannot be 
political in its classical and original sense.61 Capitalism and social inequality co-exist 
with political equality in the same place. Ergo, there is no possibility of finding a 
 
56  Gimmler (2001) at 30f. 
57  Barber (1999) at 573-589; Buchstein (1997) at 249. 
58  Barney D Prometheus wired. The hope for democracy in the age of network technology Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press (2000) at 238-269. 
59  Sunstein (2001) at 3-12. 
60  Arendt (1958) at 28-37. 
61  Arendt (1958) at 126-135. 
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common good in free political decisions, but just the fighting of different interests and 
needs. Also, if users focus on one of those spheres, there is not just the danger of 
fragmented sub-public arenas: they can choose between political debates (that may 
make some people feel uncomfortable) and private, commercial, or entertaining issues. 
Politics just becomes one (maybe not very fancy) virtual product, offered in a digital 
market. And so does democracy. This may make users non-political. 
If democracy and politics are just two products of digital markets, and if, in a liquid 
democracy, users should decide spontaneously, maybe intuitively , on their own how 
much time and energy (or money) they should invest in which product or tool, it is 
unlikely that many people will choose political participation. According to neo-classical 
democracy, users will become just private people (idotes), and the liberal homo 
oeconomicus will succeed in every sphere. Furthermore,  web 2.0 is driven by 
oligopolies, such as, Facebook and Google. If people mostly become informed and 
discuss by using the tools and algorithms of those companies, they may not get pure 
political information and debates, because of the interests of the dominating 
companies.62 Thus, making informed decisions may be possible, but only if the political 
community is able to gather sufficient information on their own during the discourse. 
This is, of course, still possible, but becomes unlikely, if the political arena is a self-
interested community.  
A liquid democracy would just be possible, if the economic power of digital 
capitalism would be banned by a supra-national authority, and this is quite unlikely. 
Supporters of liquid democracy are aware of the fact that a platform of liquid 
democracy software may not be exclusively political, but could democratise man´s life in 
general.63 However, this ignores the problem of the mix of the political and private 
spheres. It does not recognise that this causes a loss of political freedom because the 
economy dominates the public realm. Then it is not political according to the 
Aristotelian definition, which means, it does not serve the common public interest, but 
the single interests of one or more groups, maybe an oligarchic minority. Liquid 
democracy cannot offer the flexible individual and collective autonomy, the 
democratisation of a total life. If it tries to make the private life political, it will either 
become totalitarian (because it destroys the private sphere and its negative freedom if 
they decide about it in public) or make the public good  an economic good – ready for 
sale. Also,  economic power (such as the digital divide) perpetuates asymmetries of 
political power. 
3.2.6 A missing political identity 
These selected reasons speak against the possibility of a liquid democracy with a broad 
participation, and they have something in common: these arguments show that the 
assumptions of political participation via liquid democracy are idealistic and ignore the 
social basis or make its problems less central than they actually are. This is the case 
 
62  Barney (2000) at 132-191. 
63  Paech & Reichert (2015) at 507. 
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from the point of view of a classical participatory and republican approach. The digital 
sphere is not an independent area where everyone can easily act politically . This sphere 
is linked to, and contextualised in, the analogous world. That means that the possibility 
to participate politically on the Internet does not just depend on technical access and 
skills – both could improve in the future. It also depends on how economic and political 
power is structured. There, the increase of post-democracy at national and international 
levels with the huge influence of economic actors, the rise of a supra-national 
government with a loss of accountability of the representatives, and the complexity of 
political interdependences, determine it. Also, these problems get transferred to the 
digital sphere. This sphere reproduces the social basis of the analogous world, and 
maybe it does not just reproduce, but enlarge, the analogous problems for democracy. 
Thus, my point is that the Internet cannot become a sphere of liquid democracy as 
long as analogous politics has so many deficits in participation, and makes social 
inequality grow. The Internet itself may, indeed, be more immaterial than the analogous 
world,  but it is determined by materialistic and economic issues. Under these social 
circumstances a broad political free and equal participation is not possible. 
Furthermore, citizens do not fulfil the conditions that must be present to act 
democratically on the Internet when they get fragmented in private identities, or 
confronted with bots or hate speech, even more than in the analogous world. The 
Internet and politics are still driven by neo-liberalism. This cannot match with a citizen-
identity, because their own private, fragmented interests and unfulfilled needs are more 
important to them than a common good and the collective identity of a demos. Thus, the 
classical idea of democratic participation cannot become combined with an extended, 
capitalistic, industrialised nation-state, because this means a loss of participation 
(during the second transformation of democracy). Similar reasons also determine the 
third (and maybe fourth) transformations of democracy, digital and analogous.64 Thus, 
it seems as if the elitist elements still get reproduced or increased in the current 
transformation.65 
4 CONCLUSION 
The new transformation of democracy does not seem to improve the situation, 
according to the republican perspective of classical democratic participation. Indeed, it 
 
64  Usually liberalism does not highlight direct participation. Thus, as long as liberalism is more dominant 
than a republican attitude, a neo-classical democratic approach cannot be realised. 
65 The web 2.0 may be good for particular counter-public areas or as a cooperating tool for certain 
resistance movements, such as the Arab spring, if the people are willing to transfer it into the 
analogous world and it can possibly make political communication easier (on a local, national or supra-
national scale). Furthermore, the Internet could help to intensify the communication between citizens 
and politicians. Indeed, those possibilities may help to reduce some political problems. However, it 
does not solve the problem of a loss of participation with the growing size of political units. Thus, 
under those political and social circumstances liquid democracy has to fail, and will be controlled 
either by mass-hate speeches between fragmented groups or by capitalism, without enough active 
users. 
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sounds fatalistic if one states that the transformation, as a new wave away from 
participatory democracy, cannot be stopped. Of course, this would be an 
oversimplification and deterministic. My point is that under the circumstances of a 
(digital) oligopoly-capitalism, fragmentation, and digital divide, or in short, the 
omnipresent influence of large social inequalities, a cyber democracy is an unlikely 
ideal. 
There are several conditions for a (democratic) polis, described by Aristotle:66 a 
relative homogeneity of the people in social or cultural ways, a face-to-face-society, and 
a spirit of citizenship, a sensus communis or  political virtue, shown by the interest of the 
individuals to act freely, equally and for a common good. If none of those conditions are 
present for the majority of the citizens, one cannot think about a neo-classical 
democracy in order to increase participation again. Political communications may be 
made easier by ICT, but as long as social inequality dominates the Internet, a public 
realm of political equality cannot arise in this sphere. Thus, liquid democracy suffers 
from the same problems as analogous representative democracy does at the beginning 
of the third transformation , and maybe even more so because the Internet is not as 
egalitarian as optimists think, but it has hardly any political filters either: first, the 
impossibility to shape a cosmopolis that still has democratic consensus and relatively 
equal interests, and secondly, the increasing problem of representation. 
What one could think about, under certain circumstances, is establishing liquid 
democracy at a communal level, to increase participatory elements in a smaller political 
unit; because the smaller the political unit, the greater the probability will be for  direct 
participation in this public realm , at least if a payment for participation is introduced. 
This could help to minimize the problem of representation on a regional scale, if citizens 
decide on local issues they may know well. They may find consent easier. Indeed, this 
option would try to use ICT not to change the third supra-national transformation of 
democracy, but to stop it.67 What remains uncertain is the question: how digital (or even 





66  Aristotle  (2000) at b14-16. 
67  Of course, the digital age and virtual participation will influence global politics as well, not just the 
other way round. However, the way it will presumably change politics is not democratic, but may be 
anarchic. As Charles Raab and Christine Bellamy point out, the digital age could lead towards a mixed 
polity of parliamentarism and post-modernism where plural modes of decision-making, bureaucracy, 
and market processes co-exist, but without a clear sovereignty, and without truth claims, but with 
fragmented identities. (Raab C & Bellamy C “Electronic democracy and the ´mixed polity´: Symbiosis of 
conflict?” in Gibson R, Römmele A & Ward S (eds) Electronic democracy. Mobilisation, organisation and 
participation via new ICTs London/New York: Routledge (2004) at 29-38. This mixed form may be 
many things, but certainly even less participatory and egalitarian than modern representative 
democracy. 
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